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A SYMPOSIUM ON
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
FOREWORD
JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.*

In the course of his exceedingly well written rejoinder to "The Case
against Fact Pleading in Louisiana,"' John Tucker, one of Louisiana's
legal great, thus opines:
"A law suit has always been an adversary proceeding and it probably
always will be..."
"The trial being considered, therefore, as an adversary proceeding, the
necessity for the adoption of rules for its conduct which will keep the
fight out in the open, give the opponents equal opportunity, and prevent
judicial ambuscade, is imperative. '2
In the pious hope and fond belief that in the Federal Courts at
least the articles making it up will help to do this, the Editors of the
Vanderbilt Law Review have launched this Symposium, and I have
consented at their invitation to write a foreword or preface for it.
As to why they selected me for the prologue rather than some
other, anybody's guess is as good as mine. I suspect that it was in
part because, though I am not in age, I am in commission the oldest
Federal Judge in active service save one, and that one is an octogenarian who is too cagey and wily to be Tom Sawyered into whitewashing fences for others.
I know, though, why I accepted. One reason was that to feel like
a trial lawyer, to think like a trial lawyer, to be a trial lawyer, has
run for generations in my blood. For more than fifty years now I have
been serving in the Department of Errors and have humbly and afar
off followed and helped to make and unmake the law. First, a trial
lawyer, an inducer of error; next a trial judge, a producer of error;
now an appellate judge, theoretically a reducer of, actually, I fear,
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
1. McMahon, The Case against Fact Pleading in Louisiana, 13 LA. L. REV.
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a conducer to error. I count, therefore, with complete confidence upon
my colleagues of the Bench and Bar to view my efforts with no critic's
eye, but with that precious inner eye of faith which sees "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."
Until I was called to the Bench, now thirty-six years ago, I practiced law in Houston, Texas, with my father, the leader in his day
and place of the Trial Bar. I learned from him then to feel about, and
then and now to say of, the three branches of our profession, "And now
abideth law teacher, lawyer, and judge, and the greatest of these
is the lawyer." And when I say lawyer, I mean trial lawyer.
The other was that, in retrospect, I have, as they say in Tennessee,
come "a fur piece" since I came to the Bar in 1900. A Federal Court
then was not only terra incognita and out of bounds for me and the
ordinary or run of the mill members of our Bar, but especially in
equity and admiralty it was a most fearsome place in which to be. In
those early days, except for my father and one or two others for.
whom bills and bills in the nature of had no terrors, when we
stumbled or got dragged into the Federal Court, we practiced there
in the valor of ignorance and by mutual agreement.
On the rare occasions when we found ourselves confronted there
by a hardboiled lawyer who knew the rules and insisted on practicing
in accordance with them instead of by agreement, while Desty's
FederalProcedure, our only available weapon for offense and defense,
was feebly relied on by us, this reliance would have been in vain
but for the fact that a sympathetic and thoroughly informed court
clerk and a tolerant federal judge were our ever present help in time
of trouble.
As our community grew and federal litigation increased, and when
in 1912 the great reform took place and the Supreme Court promulgated the New Equity Rules of 1912, some of us acquired Hopkins
Federal Equity Rules, Foster's Federal Practice, and Benedict on Admiralty, and, moving cautiously and warily, found the sailing almost
as easy in the Federal as in the State courts.
Later, when in 1918 I became a United States District Judge with
a crowded docket, and I was floundering and struggling to dispatch
it with methods devised in and suitable for a court having little to
do and ample time in which to do it, I soon saw that I was in danger
of denying justice by delaying it, that theorizing would not save
me, only action would. I had been appointed judge. It was up to me
to be one. I recognized that judging was administration, at least in
the simple sense of getting the business done.
Fortunately under the Federal system, judges may go by assignment from district to district. I soon put myself in the way of acquiring the practical acquaintance, through experience with them,
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of rules, methods, and practices elsewhere, especially in districts having much business to do. This acquaintance with their actual working
made it very easy to put them into practice in my district.
A simple oral statement of the issues supplanted the reading of
long pleadings. A statement of the substance of depositions did away
with the interminable, the useless tedium of their long droning. The
stipulation of imcontested matters, the clarifying of the issues, and
the ascertainment in advance of trial of what matters of fact were
and what were not in dispute, and the confinement of the evidence and
the argument to contested points within the issues, remarkably
clarified and shortened trials for court and counsel alike.
At last there was time to look around a little again for more and
better methods and surplus energy to do something about them
when found. Administration had served me and others like me
well, and would serve us better in the future.
It was not, however, until I ceased to be a district judge and
became a circuit judge, that the next, and I believe the most important
of the great reforms in Federal Court procedure was instituted by
the adoption of the New Federal Rules of Civ:4 Procedure, and
judging as the administration of justice in accordance with law began
to come fully into its own in the Federal Courts.
These rules seemed to me to embody, crystalize and set down in
positive and workable form all of the reforms which we as district
judges had been trying to make and also most of our aspirations. I
was fascinated and felt at home with them, and though I was no
longer a trial judge, I went about over the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere talking at Bar meetings about, and answering questions with
regard to, the rules as one having authority and not as the Scribes
and Pharisees.
Remembering how in my early years I had lived in terror of the
Federal Courts, it seemed to me that the wheel had turned completely over. Now it was in the Federal Courts that judging had
become administration and one could walk softly and safely there,
while in the State Courts, because of administrative lacks, justice
was being delayed and thereby denied.
I was, therefore, very glad when they said to me, "Come, let us
who sincerely believe that law and judging at its best is administration at its best, join in laying a predicate in lawing and in judging
for more and better administration." For it seems to me that we are
again in the bursting time of one of law's long, slow, but greatly
glorious springs, and I look for a great flowering. In times like these,
judging is administration, and the actual and the ideal draw close
in the law. Pragmatic idealists, idealistic pragmatists are again
abroad in the law, inquiring not idly and curiously but seriously
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and with a purpose, "What are you doing and how are you doing
it?" They want to know: (1) if our tools are working well; (2) if
not, can they be made to work well; and (3) if not, why not scrap
them for other and better tools.
Though the idea that judging is the administration of justice
according to law, is very old, there is, in the acute awareness today
of the need for, and the meaning of, a functional approach in judging
as in everything else, a real modernism. It is almost as if there were
great winds blowing, throwing open the shutters of our minds, dashing down old taboo signs and cleanly sweeping away the dust and
rubbish gathered there. And so the law procedural, like the law
substantive, does grow and, growing, lives.
Thus we have come whole circle around to where we began, the
struggle between those two doughty champions, McMahon, the law
school man, attacking, and Tucker, the trial lawyer, defending fact
pleading in Louisiana, and, without taking sides, I think we can say
that Tucker is right when he says:
"The trial being considered, therefore, as an adversary proceeding, the
necessity for the adoption of rules for its conduct which will keep the
fight out in the open, give the opponents equal opportunity, and prevent
judicial ambiscade, is imperative."
"And now will I make an end. And if I have done well and as is
fitting the story, it is that which I desired, but if slenderly and meanly,
it is that which I could attain to." Maccabees II, 15, 37-38.

